A rally in support of Ukraine in Tbilisi. Photo by Democracy Defenders Georgia, via Twitter.

You have 2 more articles for free this month if you don’t register.

REGISTER NOW

Register for free to read more.
Find out about our membership plans.

Already a member? Please log in here.

Accessing the site via a library or a company subscription? There’s no need to register but you may need to contact your institution to obtain login details. Dismiss this message by clicking “X Close” button.

You have one more article for free this month if you don’t register

REGISTER NOW

Register for free to read more.
Find out about our membership plans.

Already a member? Please log in here.

As Russia-West standoff simmers, another potential geopolitical battlefield on Russia’s borders is conspicuously quiet. From Eurasianet.

Russia’s massing of armed forces near the Ukrainian border, and American and European efforts to bolster Ukraine’s defenses, have inevitably seen comparisons made to Georgia, which fought a brief war in 2008 with its northern neighbor over South Ossetia. Then, as in Ukraine today, the backdrop was Georgia’s efforts to move closer to the West and join NATO and Russia’s determination not to let that happen.

But while Ukraine has been getting vocal – and in many cases material – support from many of its allies, Tbilisi has for the most part chosen to lie low. 

Georgia’s foreign minister, in a 23 January tweet, expressed solidarity with Ukraine. But other than that, senior officials have been keeping mum. As the military buildup on the Ukraine-Russia border dominated headlines around the world, at a 24 January cabinet meeting Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili completely ignored the topic.

In comments to RFE/RL published the same day, former American ambassador to Georgia Ian Kelly said it was “unbelievable” that Garibashvili had yet to phone his Ukrainian counterpart.

“Tbilisi is embracing the ‘ostrich policy’: let’s wait and see what happens, let’s not irritate Moscow,” Kornely Kakachia, head of the Georgian Institute of Politics think tank, told Eurasianet. “This is probably because Tbilisi knows what taking an active position on Ukraine is fraught with: sanctions from Moscow, closing of the Russian market, and an intensification of borderization.”

“Borderization” refers to the hardening of de facto boundaries between Georgia proper and its two Russia-backed breakaway territories, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which Russia formally recognized as independent countries in the wake of the 2008 war. (Almost no other countries followed suit.) Russian border guards regularly detain Georgian villagers who venture too close to the newly built fences, requiring arduous, European Union-mediated talks to return them to Georgia proper.

Russia has also repeatedly slapped sanctions on Georgia, and since 2019 has banned direct flights between the two countries. Asked about the possibility of those flights being restored, Russia’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement on 21 January saying that Moscow expects a “more reserved position” from Georgia: “We remain committed to the goal of normalization of Russian-Georgian relations … but it has to be a two-way street.”

Georgia’s current ruling Georgian Dream party came to power a decade ago vowing to lower the heat in Tbilisi-Moscow relations. While it has accomplished that goal, in recent years it has also increasingly been rhetorically distancing itself from its closest ally, the United States, sounding occasional isolationist notes while appearing less and less committed to Western-backed democratization efforts.

“All of this makes Moscow think that subjecting Tbilisi to its will is a much easier business than it is the case with Ukraine,” Kakachia said. “This is why they rarely speak of Georgia.”

But many pro-Western Georgians want the government to take a more assertive position. They have been expressing support for Ukraine on social media and some gathered in front of the Ukrainian embassy in Tbilisi for a rally on 23 January. Leading opposition parties called on the Georgian parliament to issue a collective statement of support. 

As senior American and Russian officials have been meeting to discuss Ukraine and a potential broader European security arrangement, the United States has sought to assuage Georgian concerns that it would make deals about Georgia’s security behind its back. “We will not negotiate about Georgia, without Georgia,” current U.S. Ambassador Kelly Degnan said on 11 January. But some interpreted her words as indirect evidence of Tbilisi’s desire to stay out of the process. 

Even as Tbilisi chooses to lie low, some analysts believe that a new conflict could have direct implications for Georgia. “It is perilous to be under the illusion that distancing yourself from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is good for national security,” Giorgi Badridze, an analyst with the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, told the TV station Mtavari Arkhi. “By isolating yourself, you run the risk of ending up on the wrong side of a new iron curtain.” 

Kakachia made a similar point: “If Moscow achieves its goals in Ukraine, the next target will be Georgia, where the Kremlin has some unfinished business.”  

Giorgi Lomsadze is a senior contributor to Eurasianet, where this article originally appeared.