Denmark plans to soon send jailed “deportable foreigners” to Kosovo. But while this could be a quick fix and boost the young Balkan country’s efforts to join European institutions, experts see red flags.
Denmark is seen as a global role model in many ways. It regularly finishes in the top five on happiness indexes, boasts first-class infrastructure, and is renowned for a unique penal system that focuses on rehabilitation and societal reintegration rather than retributive punishment.
But not everybody is happy with the “normalization” strategy at the heart of the Nordic country’s penal system. Denmark has been exceeding its prison system’s physical and staff capacity since 2018 due to a combination of tougher sentencing and the reduced use of parole.
To help alleviate the problem, Denmark plans next year to ship hundreds of “deportable foreign nationals” incarcerated in the Scandinavian country to Kosovo, a developing Western Balkan state eager to prove itself as worthy of EU membership and admission to international institutions.
But while there are potential benefits for both countries, the plan is also fraught with problems. Critics have raised concerns about its legality, its exposure of a vulnerable immigrant prison population to rights abuses, and the prospect that it could turn Kosovo into a dumping ground for a Danish problem.
Challenges and Troubling Firsts
Starting in April 2027, the Danish government will transfer 300 foreign-national prisoners to Kosovo under a cooperation treaty intended to address “challenges relating to available correctional infrastructure” in Denmark.
The prisoners – all non-EU citizens subject to expulsion from Denmark and some of whom cannot be returned to their country of origin – will be flown to a correctional facility in the city of Gjilan, about 50 kilometers southeast of Kosovo’s capital, Pristina. The terms of the agreement call for the prison, which is currently undergoing renovations to meet Danish standards, to use its full capacity to house the imported inmates.
Denmark is not the only European state dealing with prison overcrowding. According to a study of 33 participating countries by the European Organization of Prison and Correctional Services (EuroPris), 23 other European states have also exceeded their prison capacities over the past five years. Some have turned to other countries to alleviate the problem – Belgium and Norway have each transferred inmates to The Netherlands, for example. Belgium is also exploring whether to export foreign prisoners, potentially to Albania or Kosovo. But Denmark stands to become the first to send unwanted foreigners to serve sentences in a non-EU state.
Under the Danish Aliens Act, deportable foreign nationals are defined as any non-EU national, or “alien,” found guilty by Denmark of a criminal offence. By law, such individuals must be expelled regardless of the length of the sentence imposed, and are not privy to Denmark’s rehabilitation approach.
But the move raises questions about Denmark’s adherence to EU and international rights and norms and the pressure it puts on states seeking to join the bloc to comply in order to boost their chances of admission. Some of the prisoners designated for transfer to Kosovo have been denied asylum, and cannot be returned home because they are stateless, are from countries that do not have bilateral relations with Denmark, or would face persecution or risk to their lives.
A Bet on Finances and Favoritism
Copenhagen’s arrangement with Pristina holds potential benefits for each side. Denmark can avoid the political landmine of incarcerating foreign criminals who are staying in the country illegally. And Kosovo – still unrecognized by a number of countries, including five EU members – gets the opportunity to burnish its credentials as a worthy European and international partner.
Linda Kjær Minke, a law professor at the University of Southern Denmark, casts some doubt on the idea that Kosovo is being taken advantage of. “Some say it’s because Kosovo is an EU client state,” she says. But she notes that the prisoner arrangement is “just one of many deals” in which the bloc is involved in developing Europe’s youngest country.
Since its independence from Serbia in 2008, Kosovo has relied heavily on the EU, as well as individual member states, for financial assistance and in the development of democratic institutions and rule of law.
In this case, according to Sokol Zeneli, director of programs at the Kosovar think tank Re-Act Lab, the choice of Kosovo could be seen as a reflection of the young country’s advances.
“I think it has to do a lot with the fact that Kosovo is progressing, and has been progressing very well in terms of human rights,” he says. The Gjilan prison itself, one of Kosovo’s most modern and secure penal facilities, factors into the equation because it requires relatively low investment to reach Danish standards.
Renting out the Gjilan prison offers financial and political benefits for Kosovo, with Denmark taking on most of the legal responsibility and oversight. Denmark will rent the prison for 15 million euros annually, on top of 5 million euros already paid out to bring the facility up to Danish standards.
“This is easy money. You have a facility, they’re getting it, you’re getting paid for basically doing nothing,” Zeneli says, noting that the funds can help make up for the recent loss of aid from the United States. “I think it’s based on the development needs of Kosovo as well, because we have a development strategy partly to meet reform goals required for EU accession.”
Fewer Parolees, Fewer Deportables
Penal reforms adopted by Denmark last June aim at tightening penalties for the most serious crimes, enhancing victim support, and increasing preventive efforts. But they are also expected to lead to an increase in inmates by 2030.
“A larger proportion of incarcerated people are not being paroled, because of a stricter interpretation of when and if you can be paroled,” Minke explains. “So people are serving a longer time, and if in addition to that you punish more people for a longer time, then you will face a problem of overcrowding.”
According to the Danish Bar and Law Society, which describes itself as a neutral legal organization that seeks to improve the rule of law in the country, the reforms are “politically legitimate.” However, the organization warns that there is uncertainty over the availability of space and staffing to accommodate more prisoners. Its analysis concludes that the situation could lead to more pressure on personnel and negatively affect Denmark’s unique rehabilitation approach.
Curtailing the use of parole will also disproportionately affect foreign nationals, according to Minke, due to what has been called a “bordered penalty” – the use of punishment for border control and regulating inclusion into society. The argument is that Denmark is targeting non-citizens in an effort to restrict social welfare for use by citizens, in this case by removing people liable to deportation to free up space for the country’s own prison population.
“When you target a specific group formed by people without Danish citizenship, then the measure is under Denmark’s foreign policy and it’s a signal that we don’t want these people in our country,” Minke says.
The approach also leaves open the prospect of violations of the rights of a vulnerable group.
“The treaty creates a legal ambiguity where it is not clear who will take the responsibility for what,” Zeneli explains, likening the situation to hiring a plumber instead of learning how to fix a sink yourself. “There’s a problem with the whole idea. EU member states are pushing a certain type of agenda to externalize their own problems – problems that were not created by [the third] country.”
Rights Red Flags Everywhere
Previous measures by European states to offshore “foreign” complications have raised controversy, particularly when it comes to migrants seeking asylum.
Italy’s attempt at a multi-million euro deal to send tens of thousands of asylum seekers to a detention facility in Albania, for example, came to a sudden stop soon after it opened in 2024 after rulings by domestic and EU courts. Even so, other EU states reportedly saw the move as a blueprint for dealing with their own influx of asylum seekers and migrants; and an officer of the EU Court of Justice recently revised its negative opinion of the deal, with the full court expected to make a ruling.
The situation led to calls for a common European system that would incorporate “return hubs” for those who were denied asylum and were “illegally staying in the EU.” Under proposed “innovative solutions for migration management,” a legal path would be made to allow migrants destined for return to be sent to “a third country that respects international human rights standards and principles in accordance with international law.” The proposal, still under discussion, would fall under the just-launched EU Pact on Migration and Asylum.
In the case of Denmark’s agreement with Kosovo, no prisoner transfers have taken place yet. But legal experts warn that the execution of the plan could open the door for the violation of international legal protections against discrimination and inhumane treatment.
Targeting non-Danish individuals on the grounds of nationality could constitute differential treatment under Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, according to Minke. And forcing their transfer to another country without giving notice could amount to inhumane treatment under the convention’s Article 3. “There can be a violation of both articles when transfers start happening,” the law professor says.
Re-Act Lab’s Zeneli adds another layer to discrimination concerns: impingements on the rights to privacy and family life. “You are not transferring your own citizens … you are transferring the most vulnerable groups,” he says. “What if that person is a mother who has kids. How is that kid going to be able to visit their mom in Kosovo?”
There is also the question of access to adequate legal aid and the difficulties of communication for inmates who find themselves sent to an unfamiliar setting.
“The opportunities they could get in Denmark will be [reduced]. Getting legal aid in Kosovo is different from Denmark, so that will be an issue,” Zeneli says. “In the best scenario, some will speak English. But in others, how are they going to understand each other?”
The transfer agreement will also impact Kosovo’s own prisoners. “The Gjilan prison will be vacated of prisoners who are currently there, and they need to be distributed among other facilities in Kosovo,” Zeneli says of the plan, which has not formally been disclosed. This, he suggests, raises the prospect of potential discrimination against Kosovars, assuming they will be moved to lower-standard facilities.
There is also the issue of domestic oversight, considering that no monitoring body from Kosovo will be allowed in Gjilan once the transfer takes place. Only the Danish ombudsman and representatives of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture will be allowed to carry out visits to check how transfers and treatment of prisoners take place. Most prison officers will be Kosovars, and Zeneli says they will be subject to Kosovo’s laws, while the prisoners will be treated according to Danish and EU law, creating a potential legal vacuum.
“Once the implementation starts, that’s going to be something that they need to address and it’s going to be sitting in their lap. There’s no way to avoid it,” Zeneli says.
And ultimately, while Kosovo might serve as a quick fix to Denmark’s prison overcrowding problems, it is not a long-term solution. If the deportation of the transferees cannot take place by the time they complete their sentence in Kosovo, some may still need to be returned to Denmark and await in a deportation centre.
“What if their country is Afghanistan, Syria, or Palestine, and they have no country to go to?” Minke asks. “Then they have to stay in a deportation center in Denmark.”
Rather than resolving overcrowding, the deal then merely risks prolonging the detention of foreign nationals at a high economic and human cost.
The Accession Question
Kosovo’s continuing development of human rights standards and institutions could, in theory, pose a hurdle to its efforts to join the EU. The Balkan state remains the only country within EuroPris that is not a member of the Council of Europe for example, meaning it is not subject to the European Convention nor the European Court of Human Rights in the event of breaches of human rights obligations. Kosovo has applied to join the Council of Europe, generally seen as a prerequisite for EU accession.
But Zeneli cites the shaky deal between Italy and Albania as evidence that, ultimately, the arrangement with Denmark might not harm Kosovo’s EU bid. “At the beginning, everybody was thinking that this agreement was going to [present] some issues with the accession path of Albania to the EU. But, in fact, Albania just actually expedited its own accession path.”
The same result could happen should Kosovo leverage its cooperation with Denmark to boost its accession to the Council of Europe.
Until it accedes to the Council and the EU, however, Kosovo is at a disadvantage when faced with the prospects of cooperating with EU states that could aid – or deter – its efforts to join the EU. “The risk is that the region is turning into this dumping ground,” Zeneli says.
However attractive these agreements might be at the financial or political level for states like Kosovo that are trying to advance their EU path, according to Zeneli, governments have to protect their sovereignty and pursue deals that offer long-term gains for their own nations. “Politically speaking, if a government can push for that, the political points of that government will be very high. But also the benefits for citizens,” says Zeneli.
Ana Navarro Bullo is an editorial intern at Transitions. She is studying toward a degree in the Erasmus Mundus Master’s in Journalism, Globalization, and Media specializing in human rights and crisis reporting at Aarhus University in Denmark.
