By targeting senior Muslim Spiritual Directorate officials, Russian authorities are highlighting their paranoia and fear of Islam and risk increasing tensions with Muslims. From The Jamestown Foundation.

Moscow has launched a new campaign against Islam in Russia with the arrests for bribery and other crimes of senior officials in many of the country’s Muslim Spiritual Directorates (MSDs). These are the institutions Russian governments have long used in hopes of controlling the followers of a religion without a clergy and clerical hierarchy.

These organizations have multiplied exponentially since the end of Soviet times, as many Muslims have broken with these government-backed entities to form their own independent ones (Sova, 21 May; Kasparov.ru, 23 May; Gorizontal’naya Rossiya, 25 May).

This move comes in the wake of and was likely triggered by the suggestion of a Chechen secular leader now in emigration that Muslims in the Russian Federation are ready to seize power in Moscow.

These developments are clearly intended to intimidate Muslims there, with many Russian analysts saying that it is the primary cause. Others are insisting that it will lead to the establishment of a single MSD, a move many in Moscow, especially those close to the siloviki, have long wanted (The Moscow Times, 27 April, 22 May; Telegram/@rybar, 19 May).

The actions Moscow is taking in this case are likely to backfire, not only because they will increase tensions between Russia’s Muslims, on the one hand. The Russian state and its nationalist allies, on the other hand, will thus open the way for the very radicals Moscow wants to suppress (Altyn-Orda, 23 May).

Official Islam and State Oversight

As the Russian Empire expanded into Muslim areas in the 18th century, it faced a real challenge in dealing with a religion that lacked the characteristics of other faiths familiar to its rulers. Unlike Orthodox Christianity, Islam does not have a clergy, a recognized group of people who alone can perform sacred functions.

Even more seriously from the state’s point of view, however, it lacks a clerical hierarchy through which the state can interact with and seek to control the community as a whole. Various Russian rulers have responded by creating MSDs.

In tsarist times, there was one; in Soviet times, four; but currently, there are more than 80. Various Muslim communities have broken with the official MSDs and set up their own to escape central control.

The Putin regime has been especially hostile to such groups not only because of the rise of Islamist movements generally but also because Muslims now form an increasing share of the population of the Russian Federation – more than 20 percent of the total and almost half of the religiously active population (Window on Eurasia, 5 June 2024; Levada Center, 27 June 2024).

While Putin has been more than willing to use the MSDs to mobilize and control Islam within Russia, he now appears ready to go after these structures (see EDM, 10 October 2024). At a minimum, he plans to reduce their authority and number and possibly leave the Muslim community in Russia with only a single body over which the government, rather than the Muslims, would exert control.

This wave of arrests and criminal charges against senior MSD officials is particularly significant in this context. As is so often the case with Putin’s campaigns against other groups, of course, this one has not been formally announced in Moscow but has instead begun in regions far from it.

The Kremlin is seeking to “normalize” its repressive actions while testing the waters for possible reactions. As a result, the exact number of arrests is unknown, but it has been increasing daily in recent weeks (Sova, 21 May; Kasparov.ru, 23 May; Gorizontal’naya Rossiya, 25 May).

Moscow commentators are now linking the arrests of these Muslims to foreign enemies of the Russian state, a clear sign that what the regime is doing against Muslims at home reflects its broader views (Svobodnaya Pressa, 25 May).

Consequently, while there is uncertainty as to how many have been or will be arrested and whether these actions will lead only to the reduction of the number of MSDs or the replacement of these by some new state-controlled body, there is widespread agreement as to what prompted Putin to move now.

The arrests began following the declaration by Ruslan Kutayev, the head of the Assembly of Peoples of the Caucasus and one of the five non-Russians appointed to the Russian Platform at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) – from which he has since been suspended due to comments against LGBT individuals and a refusal to condemn so-called “honor killings” in the North Caucasus.

He stated that Muslims are ready to take power in Moscow (The Moscow Times, 27 April; Telegram/@rybar, 19 May). His statements on this and other points were quickly disavowed by others on the Russian Platform at PACE – even though many of them were certainly aware that Kutayev had made equally radical remarks earlier (Window on Eurasia, 6 May 2020, 26 April).

They also alarmed many in Moscow, especially those who have long wanted to do away with the MSDs and now saw a chance to realize their goals either by destroying those headed by their opponents or by replacing the MSDs with something completely different (Window on Eurasia, 17 September 2024; Altyn-Orda, 23 May).

A Self-Defeating Strategy

The Russian government’s actions in this case will almost certainly backfire because they highlight the paranoia and fear of Moscow officials about Islam. It also raises the likelihood of increased attacks on the Muslims of the Russian Federation by radical Russian nationalists such as the Russian Community (Window on Eurasia, 7 January 2024; see EDM, 15 October 2024).

Such attacks in turn will lead not only to some Muslims arming themselves in self-defense against attacks by such groups but also to the possibility of violent clashes between Muslim groups and Russian officialdom that some emigre leaders from Muslim republics are now calling for (Window on Eurasia, 11 December 2025).

The risks of such outcomes are especially great as Russia heads into an election season. During this time, one or another group will seek to gain points by taking actions they have avoided up to now, as the country enters a succession struggle in which some will hope to embarrass the Putinists, and others will seek to take advantage of the situation to gain ground. 

Such possibilities are very real. They may lead cooler heads on both sides to back away from violence, but that is far from certain.

As one close observer in Kazakhstan of the Russian scene warns, what the Kremlin fears and what the Muslims of Russia recognize is that these attacks on Muslims now are not about religion or even its management but about the future of Russia as a unified state (Altyn-Orda, 23 May).

As he puts it, “The Muslims in Russia are not some small marginal group. These are millions of people, large regions, historical peoples, urban communities, and immigrants” in all parts of it. “Therefore, any politicization of the Muslim issue is viewed by the Kremlin not as a local problem but as a potential challenge to the entire construction of the state.”

Such trends have intensified since Putin’s war against Ukraine began, with the Kremlin’s disproportionate use of Muslims as troops. Now they have grown still further, again by the actions of the Russian state itself, which seems oblivious to the possibility that, in sowing the winds with actions like these, it may soon, as the Bible teaches, “reap the whirlwind.”

Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy.

This article originally appeared on the website of The Jamestown Foundation. Republished by permission.