The Ukraine war has weakened Russia less than many people think, with both its economy and ability to sow dissension in the West still vigorous.

Donald Trump had long promised that he would swiftly end the war in Ukraine once he returned to the White House. He is now trying to deliver on that promise, with some dramatic overtures that have upended long-standing principles underlying U.S. foreign policy. 

What are the possible outcomes from Trump’s radical approach?

Trump and Putin talked for 90 minutes on 12 February, and Moscow and Washington each sent a top-level delegation to the talks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on 18 February, headed by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. That shows that both sides are taking this seriously, and a possible deal is in the cards.

One argument for believing that the Trump initiative might succeed runs as follows. Vladimir Putin sees the arrival of Trump as a golden opportunity to strike a great deal: to secure victory in Ukraine on the best possible terms, and at the same time sow division and discontent among Ukraine’s Western allies. Russia is slowly winning the war of attrition in Ukraine, but it is coming at a cost to the Russian economy. Inflation may be running at double the officially reported rate of 10%; and many Russian companies are unable to pay their bills, or to raise money given the punitive 21% base interest rate. So this is an opportune time for Putin to cash out and declare victory. 

That all means, so the argument goes, that Putin might be willing to make some serious concessions to Ukraine to secure a deal.

The problem is we don’t know the minimum conditions Putin will demand. Certainly, he will insist on holding onto the Ukrainian territory currently occupied by Russian forces (about 18% of the country). He will also demand no NATO membership for Ukraine, or any other Western military presence on Ukrainian territory. The main problems will come in the “small print”: Russian control over key aspects of Ukraine’s domestic politics. Putin will almost certainly want Volodymyr Zelenskiy to step down as president, strict limits on the Ukrainian armed forces (such as a cap of 85,000 soldiers and a ban on long-range weapons), and possibly other constitutional changes (such as Russian-language rights).

Whatever is in the final package, it is highly likely that Zelenskiy will refuse to accept the terms. In which case, most of his European partners will probably support him. That outcome would, unfortunately, be seen as a win for both Trump and Putin. Trump would blame Zelenskiy for not ending the war (he has already, absurdly, been blaming him for starting the war, although he now admits that “Russia attacked” first). 

The main carrot that Trump can dangle before Putin is the offer to rescind the sanctions that have constrained the Russian economy, forcing it to divert its trade to Asia and the Middle East, where its new partners pay less for Russian oil and charge a premium for the machinery and spare parts they are smuggling into Russia in violation of the sanctions. So this could be a real incentive for Putin to make an offer acceptable to both the Ukrainians and Europeans.

This argument only works if you believe that the Russian economy is in serious trouble. Most independent analysts are of the opinion that its economy is robust: running a massive $120 billion trade surplus, and with government debts only 15% of GDP. The European economies – not to mention the Ukrainian economy – are in much worse shape, with trade deficits, stagnant GDP, and fiscal deficits. 

Another problem is that the Europeans would almost certainly not go along with any U.S. decision to lift the sanctions. The Europeans control the bulk of the $300 billion in Russia’s frozen assets, and their decision to cut back purchases of Russian oil and gas – both are below 10% of their prewar levels – has cost Putin over $100 billion a year. Lack of European buy-in means that Trump does not really have much in the way of economic incentives to persuade Putin to make a reasonable peace deal.

Additionally, if the Europeans resumed imports of Russian oil and gas that would lead to a fall in global energy prices and scupper Trump’s plan to boost U.S. oil and gas exports.

So this means that the most likely scenario is that Ukraine will reject the Trump-Putin pact, and the war will grind on. The “failure” of the peace initiative would legitimize Trump’s decision to end military and financial support for Ukraine, in his eyes. 

It would give Putin a new excuse to carry on fighting the war – which is probably his preferred outcome all along anyway. As analyst Tatiana Stanovaya explains, “Make no mistake – Putin is fully prepared for these talks to fail.”

Peter Rutland is a professor of government at Wesleyan University and a regular contributor to Transitions.