Thirty years ago, U.S. diplomat Christopher Hill helped negotiate the Dayton Agreement that ended the Bosnian War. He explains why Dayton has outlived its intended lifespan – and what Bosnia teaches us about ending wars in Ukraine and Gaza.
Between 1992 and 1995, multi-ethnic Bosnia descended into a hellish war after Yugoslavia’s collapse. The war culminated in the July 1995 Srebrenica genocide: Bosnian Serb forces murdered over 8,000 Bosniak boys and men. At least 100,000 people died, two million fled.
After NATO airstrikes, the United States brought the three leaders to the table: Serbia’s Slobodan Milosevic, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, and Bosniak leader Alija Izetbegovic. The Dayton Agreement, signed on 14 December 1995, divided Bosnia into two entities – the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska and the Bosniak-Croat Federation with 10 cantons – and a small autonomous district, each with its own government, under a complex constitutional system of quotas, vetoes, and rotating presidencies to prevent ethnic dominance. The central state has little power. Reforms fail amid political deadlock.
State photo.
As the director of the Balkan office at the U.S. State Department in 1995, Christopher Hill was deputy to the chief negotiator at Dayton, Richard Holbrooke. He later served as ambassador to Iraq and Serbia, among other posts, and accompanied negotiations on North Korea’s nuclear program and Kosovo.
Jana Lapper: Mr. Hill, after three years of brutal war in Bosnia, the United States forced the warlords to the negotiating table. Milosevic, Tudjman, and Izetbegovic were isolated from the outside world for three weeks. You were part of the U.S. delegation from the very beginning. What was the atmosphere like at the start?
Christopher Hill: The atmosphere was good, there was a lot of joking around. These people knew each other well. In the first days in Dayton, we had several joint meetings and a famous dinner together at the aviation museum there. I remember sitting next to the Bosnian Serb politician and later convicted war criminal Momcilo Krajisnik. Directly above his head, a cruise missile hung from the ceiling. We thought: In a few days, we’ll wrap this up. But initially, we made no progress at all.
JL: Why not?
CH: Everyone just stuck to their positions. We decided on so-called proximity talks: we met with them individually, no longer together. After an agreement was reached between Croatia and Serbia, we moved on to the main problem: the map of Bosnia.
JL: Before the war, Bosnia was a multi-ethnic country – the three largest groups were Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats. After the bloody conflicts and “ethnic cleansing,” the country was to be divided into entities along ethnic lines.
CH: Two years earlier, the Contact Group had already put forward a plan: 51% of the country for the Croat-Bosniak Federation, 49% for the Serb entity. It was important to us that people didn’t have to pack their bags and relocate. At the same time, we wanted to establish the principle known in the Middle East as the right of return: we wanted displaced people to be able to return to their land. That’s how the map became increasingly complex.
JL: Critics say that this power-sharing arrangement along ethnic lines may have ended the war, but it also cemented ethnic divisions and created a dysfunctional state.
CH: No, I reject that view. We had no intention of “cementing” problems along ethnic lines. The parties themselves did that. It’s important to remember how brutal this war was. Up to 200,000 civilians were killed, many brutally murdered. Their farms had been destroyed, their cows killed in the fields. That’s why the international community got involved. Colleagues even lost their lives in the process. It was never our goal to entrench problems “ethnically.”
JL: And yet that’s what happened.
CH: We created the most practical structure we could, given the attitudes of the parties involved. The conflict was very difficult to resolve. The Serbs had lived in Bosnia for centuries. When the Germans said there should be a referendum on Bosnia’s future, the Serbs were simply outvoted. Do you really think we sat there and said, “Let’s create a complicated structure?” No, of course we started with the simplest possible structure. But it was complicated, and we had to add more layers. That’s how we eventually arrived at what is now called Republika Srpska, where Serbs could live.
JL: Did you expect this structure to still exist 30 years after the war ended?
CH: The hope was that over the years, the parties would move from ethnic to issue-based concerns. But that’s up to them – the Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. They have failed. We never expected Dayton to still exist 30 years later. I reject the notion that Dayton doomed them to failure.
JL: Shouldn’t the international community have stayed longer or negotiated a “Dayton 2.0” later on?
CH: The international community, especially the EU, has done excellent work in the follow-up. The fundamental problem remains: the Bosniaks want a unitary state. The Serbs, on the other hand, don’t accept this and want a strong federal state because they don’t want to live under Bosniak rule.
The [Bosnian] Serb ex-leader Milorad Dodik, for example, claims all the natural resources of Republika Srpska for himself – contrary to the Dayton Constitution. This is a difficult circle to square. The EU has been very generous with aid, with support for institutions. I believe that the people and politicians of Bosnia haven’t understood that it’s now up to them to address these problems – without always pointing to the international community and complaining about their neighbors.
JL: What can the international community do to facilitate the process?
CH: I think the most powerful leverage the EU has in Bosnia is the question of EU membership. The EU should keep that door open. Everyone needs to be clear about what the goal is: a multi-ethnic country where everyone works together. Dodik, however, has only used the process to his own advantage. The EU has acted correctly by putting pressure on him and the Serbs. [The United States lifted its sanctions on Dodik in late October – Transitions note.]
I support a “tough love” approach. It can’t be that Sarajevo complains to us about Banja Luka, then we go to Banja Luka, complain there, and listen to complaints about Sarajevo. These problems need to be addressed much more directly. We’re not dealing with children here, but with a state.
The Dayton Toolbox
JL: Can we learn anything from Dayton for Ukraine?
CH: Dayton happened when the war had exhausted everyone. Everyone was ready for it to end. The problem in Ukraine is that Russia continues this war with great brutality. Russia needs to understand that it cannot achieve its goals through war. For that, we must continue to support Ukraine. This is not the time to suggest concessions to Ukraine when there are no Russian signals of concessions. That would mean they’re negotiating with themselves rather than with Russia.
JL: What conditions need to be in place for negotiations?
CH: Russia has no right to determine Ukraine’s future relationships. It’s hard to see the contours of a peace proposal. One thing I’ve learned: you have to keep channels of communication open and try to understand the other side. When we didn’t speak with Milosevic for a month, it only became harder because he only talked to yes-men. Rolling out red carpets isn’t the way, but keeping communication channels open is right.
JL: And the Middle East conflict?
CH: The important thing about Dayton was: there was a clear understanding of what was to be achieved. It wasn’t just about ending the war. It was about drawing a map, creating constitutional arrangements that protected all communities. When we met in Dayton, the work had already been done, everyone knew the plan. The essence of a good conference lies in preparation.
Regarding Gaza, it’s worrying that there isn’t even agreement on a two-state solution. Another point: it’s never good for talks when people are being killed at the same time. But ceasefires usually fail when there’s no adequate way forward. The ceasefire in Bosnia came after we had the outlines of a map, a constitution. Ceasefires don’t work when people think there’s still something worth fighting for.
JL: What did you learn in Dayton about ending a war?
CH: Everything lies in the preparation. We were well prepared. It’s also about good listening: don’t speak more than 50% of the time. Show respect for everyone’s perspectives – even the ones you find difficult to accept. People risk their lives for these things. It’s pretty unimpressive when a negotiator comes from the United States and simply dismisses people’s concerns. You have to listen to them, understand what they’re talking about, in order to make better proposals. But when you have the proposal, when things are clear, you have to stay firm. In Dayton, we understood the need to be emotionally involved, but at the same time determined about what needs to be done.
Jana Lapper is a freelance journalist based in Vienna. She previously worked for two years at German Wort und Bild Verlag and spent six years at taz, where she covered Europe for the foreign desk. She has a particular focus on the Balkans.
