Armenia is at a crossroads, one familiar to anyone who remembers Georgia’s difficult break from Russia’s orbit two decades ago. From OC Media.
The first symbolic shipment of Armenian apricots has already arrived in the EU, marking a milestone in Yerevan’s push to diversify its exports and deepen economic ties with Europe – a small but telling sign of the same trajectory Georgia once charted away from Moscow’s orbit.
The 2004 Rose Revolution turned Georgia towards the West, but at a hefty price. There was the nearly freezing winter of 2006, when a Russian gas pipeline explosion rocked the country’s energy future, a void quickly filled by Azerbaijan, followed by a large list of [Russian] embargoes disrupting key exports – trade routes were severed, and Georgian producers were forced to scramble for new markets almost overnight. A very young, ambitious government quickly acted to make the costly transition a challenge, rather than a tragedy, both economically and politically. Then came the August 2008 war, landing another major hardship on the country. While some sectors adapted to the shift westward, others never fully recovered.
Armenia now finds itself in a strikingly similar position. As Yerevan deepens its ties with Europe and gradually loosens its dependence on traditional partners, its political direction may be becoming clearer – even as Armenian apricots, among other goods, scramble to find new buyers.
Russian Sanctions Hit Armenian Products
Tbilisi has faced Russian embargoes since the fall of 2006, when Moscow imposed sanctions on Georgia’s major agricultural exports, including wine and mineral water, and almost simultaneously severed all transportation and postal links with its southern neighbor. The aim of these punitive measures was to force Georgia to abandon its Western foreign policy orientation and return to the Russian fold. Neither the economic measures nor the subsequent August 2008 war produced the outcome the Kremlin had hoped for.
Yet despite this lack of success, Russia appears to be attempting to use the same tactics against Armenia.
Over the past month, pressure from Moscow has arrived in a steady cascade.
On 20 May, Russia’s agriculture watchdog Rosselkhoznadzor restricted imports of Armenian flower products. A few days later, on 25 May, the consumer safety regulator Rospotrebnadzor suspended sales of alcoholic products from three Armenian producers: Vedi-Alco, the Abovyan Brandy Factory, and the Shakhnazaryan Wine and Brandy House.
By 28 May, Rosselkhoznadzor had turned to Armenian produce, banning imports of fresh tomatoes, cucumbers, peppers, herbs, and strawberries – a list soon expanded to include cherries, apricots, plums, peaches, nectarines, and fresh grapes. The restrictions also covered the transit of these goods through other Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) states. Days later, the ban widened further, adding pome fruits such as apples, pears, and quince, along with eggplants, potatoes, and dried fruits.
On 29 May, Rospotrebnadzor blocked sales of Jermuk, Armenia’s best-known mineral water brand, citing elevated levels of bicarbonate ions, chlorides, and sulfates.
Then, on 1 June, Rosselkhoznadzor suspended seafood imports from all but two of Armenia’s fish-processing plants after inspections that roughly half of the targeted companies had refused to undergo.
These sanctions all came just prior to Armenia’s pivotal parliamentary elections, ahead of which Russian President Vladimir Putin raised Russia’s desire for “pro-Russian” groups to participate in the elections.
According to the final results, the ruling Civil Contract party will hold 64 seats in parliament, while the opposition Strong Armenia party secured 29 seats and the Armenia Alliance won 12. Putin has yet to congratulate Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on his party’s results.
Immediate Pain, Long-Term Strategy
According to Haykaz Fanyan, director of the Armenian Center for Socio-Economic Studies (ACSES), Russia accounts for roughly 35% of Armenia’s exports and 36% of its imports overall – and the dependence runs much deeper in agriculture and food processing. By his figures, around 84% of Armenia’s alcohol exports, 93% of its fruit exports, 86% of its vegetable exports, 81% of its fish and fish-product exports, and 89% of its cut-flower exports are destined for the Russian market.
“This means that when Russia introduces import restrictions, even on a temporary basis, the impact on Armenian producers can be immediate and severe,” Fanyan tells OC Media.
Disruptions at the border, he says, quickly translate into falling producer prices and, in some cases, unsold goods that simply have to be discarded. The effect is already visible in Yerevan, where a bouquet of 20 roses can currently be bought for as little as $4 – a clear sign, he argues, of oversupply caused by the loss of access to Armenia’s primary flower market.
control of the region. Photo via Yana Amelina / Wikimedia Commons.
Trade data shared by ACSES puts a finer point on the same picture. In 2025, exports from Armenia to Russia – including both locally produced and re-exported goods – totaled nearly $3 billion. Within Armenia’s locally produced exports, the top 10 product groups accounted for 26% of total export volume to Russia, led by brandy and other strong alcoholic beverages, which generated $285 million in revenue, or 84% of Armenia’s total brandy exports worldwide. Fruit exports to Russia were valued at $104 million (93% of all Armenian fruit exports), vegetables at $86 million (98%), and fish and seafood at $81 million (97%).
“We see direct threats, not sugarcoating from Russia, oligarchs are also being used. Still, people voted pro-Western; Russia is angry, of course,” Zara Nazarian, the secretary-general of the International Union of the French-speaking Press (UPF), tells OC Media regarding the continued sanctions following the election results.
Nazarian believes that Western allies need to act now to make the country’s transition smoother than Georgia’s was.
“Farmers need to be helped with concrete plans – the West has started providing financial help, and it needs to stay consistent; no one will wait 10–15 years for EU membership. The mess must end, and concrete steps must be taken.”
Fanyan, however, is cautiously optimistic that the current restrictions will ease in the coming weeks or months, arguing that Russia’s remaining leverage over Armenia is increasingly concentrated in the economic sphere – and that preserving that leverage requires keeping trade ties intact rather than severing them outright.
Still, he argues that Armenia’s priority should extend beyond resolving the immediate dispute and toward reducing its long-term exposure to future shocks. The Armenian government has already rolled out support measures to help exporters break into non-Russian markets, subsidies that Fanyan says can meaningfully offset the costs of entering new territory. Western backing is also growing: the EU has announced roughly 50 million euros in financial assistance for Armenia and is considering autonomous trade preferences that would allow selected Armenian products to enter the EU market duty-free.
Fanyan hopes such steps will sharpen the competitiveness of Armenian exports and help the country avoid repeating the experience of Georgia and Moldova, both of which suffered serious economic damage from earlier Russian trade embargoes. He is careful, however, not to overpromise:
“We know that diversification cannot happen overnight. Establishing a presence in new markets requires investment, compliance with different standards, the development of reliable distribution networks, and the cultivation of long-term commercial relationships.”
Learning Lessons From Georgia
When comparing Armenia’s position to Georgia’s earlier experience, Georgian analyst Thornike Gordadze – who lectures at the Paris Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po) and is a visiting fellow at EPIK European Policy Institute in Kyiv – sees Yerevan in a somewhat stronger position today for two reasons: Russia is more weakened by its full-scale war against Ukraine than it was during Georgia’s pivot, and Western governments are more attuned to the risks this time around.
He also points to what he believes is a double standard in how Armenia’s own democratic backsliding has been received internationally. Pashinyan, he argues, has gotten away with actions that would be called anti-democratic if taken at face value, excused on the grounds that they were necessary to prevent destabilization. Had former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili done half as much during Georgia’s own transition, Gordadze suggests, he would not have been afforded the same benefit of the doubt.
Yet, Gordadze also looks to the election results themselves, arguing that while Armenia’s pro-Western camp saw commendable results, the pro-Russian bloc still won roughly a third of the vote, a share he considers far from negligible and likely to continue agitating to destabilize the political situation. He expects Pashinyan will need to govern with less confrontation toward Moscow, paired with sustained Western financial support – and he is candid that no dramatic breakthroughs should be expected.
“If Armenia continues on its current path,” he says, “it will inevitably pay a price – and that price will be set in Moscow, not Yerevan.”
Trying to appease Russia, in his view, simply does not work. Armenia can frame its push for economic diversification as a practical necessity rather than a betrayal, but Russia will treat it as a betrayal regardless. His advice to Armenia’s leadership is correspondingly stark: align with the West and be prepared to absorb the cost, because the alternative is losing the opportunity altogether.
For Yerevan-based human rights expert Andrzej Klimczyk, the solution lies with EU action.
“The EU should introduce a visa-free regime for Armenian citizens and step up support for democratic institutions and civil society, not just state structures. It also needs to recognize Armenia’s historical context and the different mentality of its society compared to the EU’s,” Klimczyk argues.
EU Foreign Affairs Council on 15 June 2026. Official photo.
He highlights that, unlike Georgia or Moldova, Armenia faces immediate security pressures as a result of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict – border issues and normalization with Azerbaijan and Turkey are existential, not just foreign-policy questions.
There’s also the continued risk of disinformation and hybrid interference, which Klimczyk says is made worse by low public awareness and weak institutional coordination.
“Armenia needs a unified state strategy on cybersecurity, strategic communications, and crisis response, plus closer cooperation with tech platforms to catch coordinated disinformation early. Faster, clearer communication from authorities is essential – an information vacuum is what lets even weak claims spread.”
In any case, as French-Armenian entrepreneur Lusine Bardon-Hambardzumyan puts it, Armenia is not alone.
“Armenia has been actively diversifying its economic partnerships by strengthening ties with the European Union, the United States, India, and the Gulf countries,” Bardon-Hambardzumyan emphasizes.
She is hopeful that while this does not entirely eliminate the risks, it will gradually increase the country’s resilience.
Armenia’s political path toward the West has outpaced its economic ability to absorb the consequences. Georgia’s experience suggests that such a pivot is survivable, but not painless – and certainly not quick. Whether Armenia can manage a more orderly transition than Georgia did will depend on how specifically weakened Russia is, how the EU follows through on financial and trade support, and how much patience Armenian producers and voters have.
Helena Bedwell is a veteran journalist of 30 years, splitting her time between Norfolk, UK and Tbilisi, Georgia. She mainly focuses on finance, politics, the economy, and lifestyle in Georgia.
This article originally appeared in OC Media. Republished under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
