Long-delayed vote has far-reaching implications for regional democracy and malign information operations. From IWPR.


Independent candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo and Fiodor Gagauz of the Socialist Party will meet in a runoff election on 29 November to choose the next governor of Moldova’s autonomous Gagauzia region after inconclusive results in the 15 November polling, which saw Stoianoglo gaining around 38 percent of the vote, ahead of Gagauz with 24 percent. Four in five residents of the small, fragmented region in southern Moldova are Gagauz; the primary languages are Russian and Gagauz, and Russian media rule its information space.

This interview with Moldovan communications expert Stela Leuca ran on the eve of the election.

– Transitions

Upcoming elections in Moldova’s autonomous region of Gagauzia – a predominantly Russian-speaking region of people with Turkic roots, with historically close cultural and political ties with Moscow – are shaping up as a key test of the region’s political loyalties and its relationship with the central government in Chisinau.

Amid wider tensions over Moldova’s European integration and Russian influence, Stela Leuca, executive director of Moldova’s Independent Countering Disinformation Centre (ICDC), explains why the long-delayed vote has such far-reaching implications for regional democracy and malign information operations.

IWPR: What is the background to the 15 November polls, and what are the primary stakes for voters?

Stela Leuca: The elections represent a defining litmus test for Moldova’s democratic resilience and the rule of law. Voters will participate in a dual contest to elect both the bashkan (governor) and all 35 seats of the People’s Assembly.

This election follows a prolonged institutional crisis. The previous People’s Assembly’s four-year mandate expired in November 2025, but the vote was stalled by legislative paralysis. The bashkan office became vacant after former governor Evghenia Gutul received a seven-year prison sentence in August 2025 for illicit party financing tied to Kremlin-backed networks. When regional authorities failed to schedule the vote within statutory limits, the national Central Electoral Commission (CEC) exercised subsidiary legal powers to set the 15 November date.

Also, for the first time, the Gagauz elections are being administered under Moldova’s unified national electoral code. While the 15-member Central Electoral Council of Gagauzia oversees local administration, national authorities guarantee judicial oversight. Additionally, gubernatorial contenders must demonstrate conversational proficiency in both Gagauz and Romanian, ensuring leadership can interface directly with national institutions.

While electoral competition is high – with eight gubernatorial and 135 assembly candidates – the election is vulnerable to information manipulation.

News consumption in Gagauzia leans heavily on algorithm-driven channels, with TikTok receiving 61.4 percent of the share, closely followed by YouTube, Instagram, and Telegram. In addition, over 80 percent of residents exclusively consume Russian-language media, disconnecting them from national Romanian-language independent outlets and fact-checkers.

There is also the factor of institutional alienation: Promo-LEX surveys indicate that 49.9 percent of Gagauzia residents describe Chisinau–Comrat [the region’s administrative center] relations as “bad” or “very bad,” while 38.9 percent view the People’s Assembly as illegitimate, leaving voters receptive to grievance-based narratives.

Ultimately, this election determines whether Gagauzia selects accountable, community-focused leadership or remains an operational testing ground for external hybrid interference.

What specific false or misleading narratives have been cataloged so far, and what concrete evidence is there of coordinated disinformation campaigns?

Civil society monitoring has tracked three dominant narratives designed to target local anxieties. One involves alleged linguistic erasure, framing the candidate language-proficiency requirement as a pretext to disqualify opposition candidates. This feeds broader false claims that educational reforms will ban both Gagauz and Russian, shutter local schools, and impose forced assimilation. Notably, WatchDog.MD sociological data reveals a striking identity paradox: despite substantial Turkish infrastructural investment, most residents do not identify primarily with their Turkic ethnic roots or speak fluent Gagauz, nor do they feel ethnically Russian, yet they remain firmly inside Russia’s linguistic and media orbit while rejecting Moldova’s EU integration path.

Another narrative spins anti-corruption measures and legal oversight from Chisinau as existential threats to Gagauzia’s autonomy. Promo-LEX tracked a single coordinated narrative push on this theme across more than 70 accounts that generated over 7,400 reactions, 3,100 comments and 1,400 shares.

Then there are the false allegations that EU integration will trigger compulsory NATO accession and lead to the forced mobilization of Gagauz youth for foreign military conflicts.

Within the first two weeks of the official campaign, launched on 16 October, monitoring exposed clear foreign and synthetic interference. Outlets like Omega Jurnal (administered from Indonesia and Ukraine) ran sponsored Russian-language Facebook ads boosting specific local candidates while disseminating anti-government content in Romanian.

WatchDog.MD uncovered a cluster of 20 anonymous TikTok accounts created simultaneously on 16 October, the very first day of the electoral campaign, to artificially amplify candidate Fiodor Gagauz, the candidate backed by the pro-Russian Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova. In under six days, this cell generated over 145,000 views, 500 comments, and 3,400 shares by deploying identical video clips and automated cross-commenting.

What responsibility do local politicians, media outlets, and digital platforms bear when false election-related claims circulate?

Countering election disinformation requires coordinated accountability across three primary spheres. Elected officials and contenders have a duty to uphold constitutional standards, respect judicial independence and avoid weaponizing legal rulings for political gain. Following Gutul’s conviction, regional leaders breached this duty by reframing a 40-million-lei ($2.2 million) illicit financing case as a political attack on the Gagauz people, manufacturing grievance to undermine judicial legitimacy.

In addition, local outlets have an ethical obligation to maintain editorial independence and avoid functioning as propaganda conduits. National and international partners must invest in independent multilingual reporting – specifically in Gagauz and Russian – to ensure non-Romanian-speaking voters receive verified, fact-checked news.

Digital platforms also have a clear duty of care to enforce their own terms of service, restrict unauthorized monetization and demote coordinated inauthentic behavior during elections. Platforms currently fall short by permitting sanctioned figures to buy unlabelled ads and optimizing engagement around fear-based, polarizing narratives. Platforms must actively police bot networks, enforce transparent political ad registries, and mitigate algorithm-driven amplification of destabilizing falsehoods.

Does evidence show that disinformation is altering behavior or trust?

Geopolitical polarization is the master narrative through which local election dynamics are manipulated. Disinformation networks frame the political choice as an existential civilizational conflict between Russia and Europe, juxtaposing a caricatured image of the EU as a source of economic destruction, traditional value erosion, and military escalation against an idealized image of Russia as the sole guarantor of stability, cheap energy, and cultural preservation.

Geopolitical messaging is also weaponized as a zero-sum identity conflict. Pro-Kremlin networks present the EU as an existential threat that will strip Gagauzia of its autonomy, dismantle traditional values, and drag Moldova into regional war. At the same time, Moscow is marketed as the sole protector of regional sovereignty, identity, and economic survival. This narrative conditioning has altered voter behavior and eroded democratic trust.

According to the IPP Public Opinion Barometer (BOP), nearly 50 percent of Gagauz residents feel unrepresented by any political party, reflecting deep cynicism and estrangement from national governance. Claims that national courts and the CEC lack jurisdiction have also degraded public trust: 38.9 percent of voters view the regional assembly as illegitimate, and half describe Chisinau–Comrat relations as hostile.

Gagauz bashkan Evghenia Gutul arrives for a court hearing accompanied by her husband and son on 5 August 2025. Gutul is serving a seven-year sentence for illegally financing a political bloc tied to the pro-Russia party of fugitive Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor. Photo by Vladislav Culiomza / Reuters

How vulnerable are voters to fabricated claims and how can long-term resilience be built?

Voter vulnerability in Gagauzia is acute, driven by a combination of socio-economic stress, cognitive echo chambers, and persistent information asymmetry.

Voters are receptive to narratives that Chisinau is overstepping its constitutional boundaries when it comes to the Gagauz autonomous region, with standard legal reforms or anti-corruption proceedings portrayed as central-government hostility against regional autonomy.

Political and government communication remains reactive, rebutting disinformation only after sensationalist narratives have achieved saturation across local channels. Media prebunking efforts are also minimal.

Poverty among retirees and public sector workers leaves them susceptible to promises of cheap Russian gas, social bonuses, or digital crypto transfers disguised as humanitarian relief.

Youth and educated professionals are somewhat more protected by high digital literacy and access to pluralistic media sources, so this pro-reform segment is generally skeptical – although not immune – to synthetic disinformation.

Long-term resilience requires expanding multilingual education and fostering inter-ethnic civic integration. In the immediate term, nonpartisan election observation by Promo-LEX provides essential transparency to counter false fraud claims.

Why is Gagauzia critical within the wider information environment surrounding Moldova’s political future?

Gagauzia occupies a central strategic position in Moldova’s democratic trajectory for three core reasons.

First of all, external actors use Gagauzia to stoke friction between Comrat and Chisinau and construct veto points to stall Moldova’s EU accession path and project an image of territorial instability. Furthermore, its geographic position along the Ukrainian border and non-contiguous territorial makeup make it an ideal target for subversion that could spill over into Transnistria. Additionally, maintaining and supporting points of anti-European sentiment so close to the border with Ukraine and Romania gives Russia a potentially useful space.

Secondly, Gagauzia functions as an operational testbed for foreign interference, where illicit financing, bot networks, automated social media factories, and generative AI strategies are piloted to identify potent triggers before being deployed at scale nationally.

Thirdly, Gagauzia represents the ultimate benchmark for Moldova’s social cohesion model. Demonstrating that an autonomous, predominantly Russian-speaking minority community can thrive, protect its unique identity, and maintain democratic self-governance within a sovereign, EU-oriented Moldova is the definitive counter to foreign destabilization. 


This interview originally ran on the website of the Institute for War & Peace Reporting (IWPR). Republished by permission.