As Hungary heads to the polls, it’s worth looking back at how and why Viktor Orban created an “illiberal” system and how he got away with it at home and abroad.
Since 2010, Orban has combined repeated electoral victories with the systematic centralization of power, weakening democratic institutions while promoting a strong nationalist agenda rooted in historical grievance and victimhood. By positioning himself as both a defender of national sovereignty and an anti-establishment figure, he has built a durable political system that blends populism with far-right rhetoric – one that resonates not only within Hungary but increasingly across Europe and beyond.
The following are excerpts from a panel discussion of prominent Hungarian experts on these topics and more that took place at Presseclub Concordia on 26 March 2026 as part of the European Contexts discussion series. Mirjana Tomic organized and moderated the event. The full discussion can be viewed on YouTube.
The speakers mentioned in these excerpts:
Zsuzsanna Szelenyi is a Hungarian political analyst, author, and former politician. She is a program director at the Central European University Democracy Institute, and author of Tainted Democracy, Viktor Orban and the Subversion of Hungary, as well as a non-resident senior fellow with the Center for European Policy Analysis. Szelenyi started her political career as a member of Fidesz when it was a liberal party during the transition period in 1988. She served as a member of parliament starting 1990 but left politics and Fidesz in 1994, when the party changed its political position from liberal to conservative.
Peter Magyari is an award-winning Hungarian journalist, working for the conservative-liberal news site Valasz Online. He teaches journalism at different universities and is a regular commentator on Hungarian radio and TV programs. In 2010, Magyari received the Investigative Journalist of the Year award and in 2020 he was the recipient of the National Hungarian Press Association award for lifetime achievement.
Botond Feledy is a Brussels-based geopolitical expert, lawyer, political commentator and the director of Red Snow Consulting and the European Leadership Program. His research focuses on Euro-Atlantic security issues, as well as on Hungary’ foreign policy. Feledy is a regular contributor to the online political channel Partizan.
16 Years of Illiberal System
Mirjana Tomic: How is it that Viktor Orban, a politician from a small European country of approximately 9.5 million inhabitants, became a symbol of the far right, or radical right movements in Europe? … French politician Marie Le Pen praised his intelligence, courage, and vision, [saying] Hungary has become a symbol in Europe of a proud and sovereign people’s resistance against oppression. My first question will go to Zsuzsa, because Zsuzsa said about seven years ago in Vienna that Viktor Orban … is no longer interested in Hungary. He’s interested in making history in Europe. Is he managing? Austria’s Herbert Kickl is not a symbol, and neither are other far-right politicians. Why Viktor Orban? What has he done so successfully?
Zsuzsanna Szelenyi: This is one of the big questions, of course. … Fidesz has already won four elections where he received a super majority, a constitutional majority. This is a situation which no other country in Europe ever witnessed since World War II. And I think it’s important to know that this is an extraordinary power, and we just cannot underline how big a power it is. So Orban gained this power in 2010 at democratic elections. It was not a very good election system we had, but basically it gave him the opportunity that with the support of 52% of the popular vote, he received 67% of the mandates in parliament….
So this superpower – in a small, relatively centralized, homogeneous country – provided him an opportunity to experiment in Hungary. And after the 2008 [financial] crisis, there was a lot of confusion in the West understanding what this was, and this created room for Orban to go beyond the usual norms and see with the European elites how far he could go. He started to maneuver, and he realized that he could do that without much response.
So this is the start of his march toward international recognition and fame. … The reason why Orban was successful was he introduced – through this maneuvering, through this experimenting, on top of this big power he had in Hungary – a political style which was, and oftentimes still is, new in Europe, but he has been doing now for 16 years: very aggressive, very assertive, transactionalist politics, in the short term to gain the most out of the moment and he was always successful. He … recognized that the rest of Europe’s political culture is a relatively decent style. There are certain rules, even rules which are not written, but still, their ethos. And he just did not keep them. So he introduced this very aggressive mood, which we know from other countries, but it’s a very autocratic style. And he managed more and more. And European elites for a long time did not recognize that this is a danger …
He created, from this leadership style, a whole system, which he called an illiberal system. And when he said it, it was 12 years ago, he meant it — illiberalism means not liberal, right? So he basically went, clearly and openly, against everything. What are the bases of the liberal democratic system? So it’s basically the neutrality of the state. It’s rule of law, separation of power, an open society, a pluralist society with many ideas. These are all the bases which Orban went against. So he started to centralize the state, occupy the state, capture state institutions, and created a party state or a state party. The Fidesz party is equal to the Hungarian state, and state resources, human capital, institutions, money, are used for partisan purposes.
And then, just to conclude this, the separation of power, obviously, he does not respect it. It means that they don’t take it seriously. So obviously, all the institutions – the checks and balances – are now filled by loyalists who are serving the party’s interest. And finally, the open society, the pluralistic state … Illiberal is anti-liberal. So basically, Orban’s party is using state resources to promote a certain set of values, which they call conservative, though it’s not really conservative. Conservatives can tell why. But they [Orban’s party] use institutions, cultural institutions, educational systems, and everything to support one party’s interests and certain values. And this is what is so spectacularly successful in Hungary after 16 years, again with a super majority in power. And of course, many wanna-be autocrats like this most. This is a model. This is a playbook. It can be adapted to basically any other political environment
The Narrative Behind the Power
Peter Magyari: Orban’s success are international moves based on Hungarian internal aims. So when he was still a liberal prime minister at the end of the 90s, he wanted to show that he is not just a politician, but he is someone and his movement is something that could [determine] the fate of the Hungarians. And to understand it, it’s very important to understand that kind of mindset. In elementary school, all Hungarians learn from 19th century poets that Hungary should be bigger, stronger, more influential. Unfortunately, we lost a lot of good things because of foreign attacks – Turkish, Habsburg, and so on. But we have to be grand again or we will die.
It has always been with us since the 20th century. It was a part of the story, the communication around it was different in the communist era – “it’s really about the power of the proletariat.” … But the story is the same. We deserve more, and Orban has always acted as someone who is able to be more and it’s very important to show for himself that he became a player in an international league. He is close to the American president, the Russian president, even the Chinese president, more powerful than any other prime minister in the region – and almost as powerful as the big European heads of state. And to achieve this, he could find a grand narrative with this illiberal story.
In 2010 he won on a ticket not with an illiberal promise. If you see the Fidesz program in 2009-10, it was fully liberal – back to democracy and so on. And when Russia became stronger with the conflicts in Ukraine in 2013 and 14, then he felt there’s an opportunity, because the West was really soft against the criminal situation, the Donbas situation, and he felt there’s a rising, new radical right. … And he found out there’s a story, there’s a market where he could be the first – because he was already in power with the democratic ticket – and he changed his narrative, and he could show how you rule with this kind of narrative. So I think that is the story of his success. But his first aim was not to influence the world. His first aim was to show the Hungarians: “I am the one who [determined their fate]” – to go back to the world-leader phase for a small country.
Botond Feledy: If you understand this populist thing as a political scientist, as anti-pluralist, we can talk about that later. But it’s also important [that it is] anti-establishment. And imagine a politician who has been in power for 16 years being anti-establishment. That’s the world champion of ant- establishment rhetoric, and that is putting him in this uncomfortable position that anything anti-establishment must be outside of Hungary… Therefore, it already started with George Soros, but then the United Nations in 2012, and then you can go on and on with all the presidents of the European Commission. And it is even more amplified today, so this is then easier to connect with other politicians from other countries who happen to be attacking the world. Most of the smaller countries were at some time in their history under some kind of occupation or foreign influence. But even in big countries, which were colonialist same international actors for good reason or not.
Szelenyi: What Peter said is very important, and we translate it as this victimhood-based politics as a Hungarian specialty, but it is not. What is fantastic and what we could see over the last decade is that this story actually fits in any country of the countries before, they can also [fit] because they lost their colonies, so the victimhood idea is such a human thing that it can be used as a political tool, basically anywhere in the world, even in the United States, even probably also in China, right? … So you can always pull it out, and you can always build it. And this is also kind of a big secret behind the influence, because Orban speaks about this, represents it, and everyone can attach themselves to this. So it resonated very widely … he’s the revolutionary, who is against any kind of big power. So it’s very good for a conspiracy theorist’s narratives.
Mirjana Tomic is the moderator of the European Contexts seminar and conversation series focusing on politics and media in Europe. She works for two Vienna-based organizations: Presseclub Concordia and the Forum for Journalism and Media. Excerpted by permission. Edited for length and clarity.
