Despite concern in European capitals over his past rhetoric, Rumen Radev’s room for anti-EU maneuvering may be more limited than comparisons to Viktor Orban suggest.
Bulgaria’s prolonged political crisis may have reached a turning point. The eighth snap elections since 2021 were won by the new political project of former President Rumen Radev.
His Progressive Bulgaria (PB) movement, set up just four months ago, won 44.7% of the parliamentary elections held on 19 April. PB secured a majority of 135 seats in the 240-seat parliament, marking the first time since 1997 that a single Bulgarian party will have sufficient seats to govern alone. This majority win could mark the end of chronic fragmentation that has prevented the formation of stable governments.
In an interview with Transitions’ Sian Olislagers, Maria Simeonova, head of the Sofia office of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), gives her take on what the results of the election mean for Bulgaria and whether the country can now leave its politically turbulent years behind.
The ‘New Orban’ Question
Olislagers: Some of the international press have portrayed Rumen Radev as the “next Orban.” How accurate is that comparison?
Simeonova: To answer this, we must understand why his election evoked those comparisons and go back to his track record. Radev became president in 2017, so he is not new to the Bulgarian political scene. Throughout his two mandates, he made certain statements that are now resulting in the comparison with Viktor Orban.
He questioned the EU’s policy toward Ukraine, and in this regard the efficiency of sanctions against Russia, as well as military and financial aid to Ukraine. Arguing that certain moves by the West are dragging Bulgaria into the war.
So, from this point of view, he expressed scepticism, which naturally has raised questions about whether, as prime minister, he could take this [attitude] forward and block decisions.
However, the comparison with Orban is not accurate right now. Orban managed to build a whole infrastructure, a whole system that was empowering him and those around him. Orban built very solid ground for his ideology and then was able to step on this solid ground to block certain decisions, or in most cases get something in return in order not to block it. Hungary lost a significant amount of EU funds because of its refusal to implement certain reforms, while Orban expanded partnerships with third countries, namely Russia and China.
In the case of Bulgaria, the situation is different. We recently joined the eurozone on 1 January; [we have] high inflation, prices are increasing, and skyrocketing in addition [because] of the war in the Middle East, which is contributing to the high prices. In these difficult economic times, in order to benefit from EU funds, which Bulgaria desperately needs, the government needs to finalize certain reforms by August.
So, the proliferation of [describing] Radev as the “next Orban” is not correct and overexaggerated. Now that Orban is gone, I would doubt that Bulgaria would feel comfortable being the one blocking decisions.
Olislagers: How should Radev’s past statements about Russia and Ukraine be perceived?
Simeonova: I think that those statements were directed more at the domestic audience than at the EU. He’s been preparing for these elections for a long time, and very often he would follow the prevalent opinion in Bulgarian society in order to increase his popularity. Statements especially related to Ukraine are exactly such statements.
In the majority, Bulgarian society is very pro-European. But in terms of the war in Ukraine, it also follows a similar line [as Radev], preferring for the war to stop and for Bulgaria to be neutral in this conflict. So, Radev’s statements made sense to the predominant public sentiment.
Radev is unlikely to openly adopt an Orban-style rhetoric, at least in his engagement with European counterparts. His criticism – particularly regarding financial and military support for Ukraine or sanctions against Russia – will be aimed primarily at the domestic audience.
The goal of these statements was to [capitalize] on them and build a political project that, as we saw, would secure a parliamentary majority, which he accomplished.
But whether he will take [that rhetoric] to the EU level? He will be expressing skepticism and be critical of some decisions, but using veto power is a nuclear option that will not bring him any benefits.
I think the change would come from him being more critical of the shortcomings of those measures [concerning Ukraine], but he will be pragmatic and will not block them. In this way, he will continue the current course.
I don’t see Bulgaria becoming a difficult partner within the EU, at least not for now.
Olislagers: What does Radev’s electorate look like and what does that mean for his room for maneuver?
Simeonova: Radev managed to attract people with very different profiles. He took votes from the electorate of all parties in parliament. His electorate is not homogeneous – it’s the opposite. There were moderate pro-Russians that voted for Radev; there were moderate pro-Europeans that voted for him, just like there were pro-Europeans who were eurozone opponents.
So, it’s very difficult to define Radev’s electorate; there’s no single profile. One of the most difficult things for him will be how to keep this electorate and [figure out] how to talk to all of them simultaneously while they differ so much.
My logic would be that because he needs to satisfy all these various groups, he will not go to radical extremes, because he risks losing a big part of the people that voted for him.
Olislagers: How much does EU membership constrain Radev in practice?
Simeonova: Bulgaria still needs to receive funding from the national recovery resilience plan. Also, the next budget is being negotiated, even as we speak, at the summit in Brussels. So Radev realizes that Europe is what unites the majority of Bulgarians – the idea of belonging to Europe.
On the other hand, this has a material dimension, and that’s the funding that Bulgaria receives. It is still a net-beneficiary, receiving more than it contributes to the EU budget, like most Central and Eastern European countries.
So, the benefits are there, and the feeling of belonging is there. Besides the material interests of receiving EU funds, Bulgarian society also realizes that the EU brings benefits that no other geopolitical alternative could offer.
Olislagers: What role will defense and EU cooperation play in Radev’s agenda?
Simeonova: As a former pilot, Radev might prioritize military modernization and the strengthening of defense capabilities, areas where cooperation with both the EU and NATO will remain essential.
One of his priorities will be strengthening defense capabilities – he’s been talking about that since he first appeared on the political scene. He believes in this, and because of his military background, he knows how to do it.
At the same time, he realizes that EU mechanisms will be important. Bulgaria has submitted projects for development loans, approved by the European Commission, now awaiting government approval, which will be one of the first tasks.
So even on this front, whether social cohesion funds or defense mechanisms, Radev will need the EU for delivering his program.
Olislagers: How important is the distinction between rhetoric and policy in Radev’s case?
Simeonova: He used rhetoric in order to win the elections in order to present himself as an alternative to the inability of the Bulgarian political parties to offer a stable, regular government. These were the eighth elections in five years, so apparently there was huge fragmentation.
And Radev’s a good speaker – he’s very disciplined … using this to build on his popularity as president.
I think he will not get into extremes just because internally, in his party, it will be very crucial to keep this support and to also form a party, because now he needs to build the party from scratch.
Olislagers: Will Radev challenge Europe or seek legitimacy within it?
Simeonova: Given his landslide victory at home, he is likely to now seek external legitimacy through building relationships with other European leaders.
He has a very big majority. We haven’t seen so many people vote for a single party since the 1990s. Now he will want to build legitimacy outside of Bulgaria.
One way to do this is through the European Union and NATO, and by winning the trust of other European leaders, to prove that he [cab bring] stability in Bulgaria, something that has been missing for many years. He will fulfill the rule-of-law reforms and the reforms that Bulgaria has been struggling with for years.
I think there is no concern within the European political scene. Radev is well-known to most leaders because he often represented Bulgaria during five years of political crises.
If we are looking for potential risks, the focus should be on whether more European leaders unite around this EU skepticism narrative. If this group expands, it could impact the direction of EU policies. But Radev has more things to do in Bulgaria than outside.
Olislagers: What is the sentiment amongst Bulgarians about the election outcome?
Simeonova: Relief rather than enthusiasm. This marks the end of political fragmentation. Bulgarians have become very exhausted with constant elections and ongoing fights within parliament.
They were also angry with the inability of political parties to unite around national interests. That is why, in December 2025, Bulgaria witnessed the biggest protests since the 1990s. And not the opposition leaders, but Radev presented himself as the one who could address these concerns and solve the political impasse.
There is no widespread enthusiasm, but there is widespread relief.
Maria Simeonova focuses on EU foreign policy and Bulgaria’s role in the EU as the Head of the ECFR Sofia office. She previously worked as a civil servant at the Bulgarian Ministry of Finance and completed traineeships with key EU institutions, including the European Commission.
Sian Olislagers is an editorial intern at Transitions. He is studying for a bachelor’s in international journalism at the Artevelde University of Applied Sciences.
