Magyar’s Mandate: Six Insights From a Post-Election Hungary

Polling reveals that Hungarian Prime Minister Peter Magyar’s mandate is far more complicated than EU leaders were hoping for: voters want domestic repair first, are split on Ukraine, and increasingly reluctant to ditch Russian energy. From ECFR.

When Peter Magyar was sworn in on 9 May, he became prime minister of a country shaped almost entirely in one man’s image. After 16 years of Viktor Orban’s illiberal rule, the opposition’s victory could not come soon enough for European leaders. They expect Hungary under Magyar to be more constructive toward Brussels and Ukraine, more cautious about Russia, China, and Donald Trump’s America, and no longer the EU’s blocker-in-chief.

But whether Hungary’s reset can materialiae on the European and world stage will hinge on the success of Magyar’s narrower agenda to bring domestic change. He was brought to power in a nationwide backlash against the undemocratic practices of his predecessor – and by promising to serve as the voice of the people. Should he and his Tisza party disappoint that political energy or appear to neglect Hungarians’ will, they could see their popularity dwindle and the parliamentary majority break up. Change has well and truly come to Hungary, but change is vulnerable – Orban and his Fidesz party, or others, could always be there to pick up the pieces.

Magyar’s popular mandate is therefore key to keeping the country’s political future on track. To better understand it, ECFR polled Hungarians a week after the election. This, coupled with our previous poll conducted just before the April 12th vote, allows us to identify six reasons why Magyar could be in for some tough calls.

No.1: Hungarians voted against Orban, not for Magyar

Hungarians largely voted for Tisza because they wanted a “change,” rather than voting for the party itself. The mere ousting of Orban may have satisfied this in part. But voters want change beyond a specific policy or leader. Indeed, Magyar’s mandate may be weaker than the ecstatic images from election night might suggest.

After the election, we asked Tisza supporters to explain in their own words why they voted for the party. Most mentioned a desire for change or systemic reform, followed by anti-Fidesz sentiment and an exasperation with corruption and mismanagement. Just 15% referred to either Tisza’s vision or to the qualities of its leader.

Similarly, in another open question, half of Tisza voters pointed to the dissatisfaction with Fidesz and a desire for change as the main reason behind its electoral success. The second reason most quoted by Tisza voters was Fidesz’s corruption and mismanagement. Only 21% pointed to Tisza’s program or other positive attributes.

Thus, for most voters, policy or leadership considerations came second to getting rid of Orban. Now the real task for Magyar begins: defining his own vision for Hungary and getting his voters on board.

No. 2 Domestic matters come first

Magyar has a strong mandate for prioritizing putting Hungary’s own house in order. When we asked people, in a closed-choice question, to rank up to two most-important issues facing Hungary, they focused on domestic matters like cost of living, the state of public services, corruption and governance, economic growth, and jobs. This is true for before and after the election. Meanwhile, “relations with the EU” are mentioned as one of the two most important issues facing Hungary by only 15% of people and 21% of Tisza voters.

Hungarians across the political spectrum recognize that repairing their country – whether it’s about improving the economic situation or the rule of law – will not be easy. That should give Magyar some leeway. But Donald Tusk’s short-lived popularity in Poland serves as a cautionary tale against not being quick enough.

No. 3 Hungarians are pro-EU

Third, even if relatively few consider relations with the EU as a priority for their country, they do expect – and support – the new government to rebuild Hungary’s links with Brussels. 

Nearly 80% nationally expect Hungary to improve relations within the EU under the new government. Almost as many expect Hungary to get access to the frozen EU recovery funds – even if a majority does not expect this to be easy.

This does not mean, however, that Magyar can afford slow progress on this matter – not least because unfreezing most of the EU money needs to happen by the end of this summer. But most voters would probably understand why the new government needs to spend much of its energy in the next few months on getting this done, and they might also accept some trade-offs.

If Magyar were to get EU money flowing to Hungary again, it would be his administration’s first big achievement. It would also symbolize Budapest’s reorientation toward Europe, which is what most voters are calling for. Three-quarters of Hungarians – and majorities in the electorates of both main parties – support their country’s EU membership. There’s even a national majority who want Hungary in the eurozone.

More broadly, a closer alignment with European partners is also a preferred foreign policy direction – with a balance between the West, Russia, and China (a preferred option of Fidesz voters) coming a distant second nationally.

No. 4 Support for Ukraine has its limits

Magyar will have a mandate for improving relations with Ukraine, but this only goes so far. Hungarians expect Budapest to approve the EU’s financial support for Ukraine and to mend its relations with Kyiv. (Perhaps some Hungarians realize this is the bare minimum for the EU to unfreeze its money for Hungary.)

But Magyar lacks a mandate for more ambitious ways of supporting Ukraine. A majority would oppose his government unblocking the EU’s membership negotiations with Ukraine, and even Tisza voters are split on this matter. Majorities – both nationally and among Tisza voters – would oppose the new government supporting Ukraine financially and even greater numbers would be against military support.

There are two Ukraine-related policies where Magyar might be torn between his national and partisan loyalties. On whether his government should allow the transit of military aid to Ukraine through Hungary, the country as a whole is opposed but his voters are mostly supportive (yet less so than before the election). Similarly, over half of Hungarians reject Ukraine eventually becoming an EU member, while his own voters are mostly in favor.

This could spell two political challenges for Magyar. One is that his electorate might be underestimating how important opening Ukraine’s accession negotiations are for Hungary’s European partners – or they are simply not linking it to Hungary normalizing its relations with Brussels. Either way, Magyar will need to defend the idea among the mostly sceptical public.

The other more distant challenge concerns Ukraine’s road to EU membership once accession negotiations are over. During the campaign, Magyar vowed to hold a binding referendum on the matter once it becomes a real prospect. But that means washing his hands of that consequential decision and very likely accepting a Hungarian “no,” which would run contrary to the instincts of most Tisza voters.   

No. 5 A majority want to keep importing Russian energy

Then come Hungary’s relations with Russia, on which Hungary remains strongly reliant for energy imports. One of the big differences between the Tisza and Fidesz electorates is that the former rarely see “energy security” as one of the two most important issues facing Hungary – whereas this is consistently “the” most important matter for Fidesz voters (as demonstrated by our polls before and after the April 12th vote).  

But even if “energy security” is not at the top of Tisza voters’ minds, its importance seems to be sinking in. Before the election, two-thirds of Tisza supporters were in favor of stopping the purchase of Russian fuels and only a quarter were against. This clear policy steer is no longer there. Now just under half of Tisza voters support giving up Russian energy, while 38% are against. And a national majority (52%) has emerged opposing the halt to Russian energy imports.

While this gives Magyar more room for maneuver domestically, it may create tension with Brussels and other European capitals. They may conclude that the new government is not doing enough to end its dependence and is watering down the EU’s hard-won unity on the matter. Magyar could seek a compromise with European partners by showing his support for sanctions against Russia (which most of his electorate support); but it remains to be seen whether this could be enough for Brussels – especially if EU funds are hanging in the balance. Orban has launched a legal challenge to the REPowerEU regulation on banning Russian gas by September 2027. It is unclear whether Magyar will support this claim or not.

No. 6 There is a (somewhat) progressive agenda

The final point concerns an ideological heterodoxy of Tisza voters. Several commentators were quick to suggest that Magyar and many of his voters are on the right of the political spectrum. But our polling shows that most embrace key elements of the progressive agenda (on, for example, climate and LGBTQ+ rights). Yet this does not stop them from supporting traditional family policies, too.

An overwhelming majority of Tisza voters, and of the Hungarian public, support the new government having an ambitious climate policy. This should encourage the new administration to treat renewables and clean energy as a way to limit the country’s reliance on fossil fuels from Russia.

Tisza voters clearly want the new government to protect LGBTQ+ rights, which is also a prevailing view among the national public, even if Fidesz voters are mostly opposed. Paradoxically, Tisza voters are also supportive of traditional family policies (such as incentives for marriage and having children). Regardless, this should empower EU institutions to insist the new administration addresses LGBTQ+ discrimination in accordance with the recent ECJ ruling that Hungary’s current policies defy EU values. Whatever Magyar’s views are, the mandate from his voters is too clear to be ignored.

Striking a balance with Budapest

The EU faces a dilemma. How much pressure should it exert on Hungary to change course on Ukraine, Russia, and other issues as a precondition for the release of the EU funds when Hungarian society has a lukewarm attitude to such a U-turn? Which risk is greater – that of missing an opportunity for political reorientation or that of pushing for it too hard and diverting the new administration’s scarce resources from putting the Hungarian house in order?

Budapest’s broader political reset will not seem legitimate to voters if Magyar does not first deliver on the narrower agenda of systemic change. This is the clear priority for Hungarians. If they are disappointed, there will be little goodwill left for him to bring about change in other policies. The EU will need to calibrate its approach carefully. But it is in the interest of both Magyar and his European partners for it to be about far more than just getting rid of Orban.

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Pawel Zerka is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations’ (ECFR). Piotr Buras is the head of the ECFR Warsaw office and a senior policy fellow at the ECFR, where this article originally appeared. Republished by permission.