By Milica Delevic
On 30 September, the European Commission is expected to unveil a comprehensive document on EU enlargement, which will be used as a basis for discussion by the European Council in October. The paper is likely to confirm that Montenegro and Albania could finish negotiations soon. But it should also propose ideas on how other countries in the region without this perspective can move forward in their own EU accession journeys.
Any Western Balkan country that joins the EU after waiting over 20 years deserves to be celebrated; the two frontrunners should be commended for making best use of this opportunity and supported to make it over the finish line. But by focusing on these two countries, the EU has prioritized quick wins. Montenegro and Albania have demonstrated commitment to reform, but also have no major bilateral issues to resolve or difficult neighbors to reconcile with.
Montenegro in particular, given its small size and its lack of significant outstanding issues with neighbors, seems ideal for making the case for enlargement as a low-cost and problem-free geopolitical gain. Indeed, commission officials recently compared the annual cost of Montenegro’s entry to the EU per EU citizen to that of a cup of coffee.
However, going for low-hanging fruit must not serve as cover for the EU not achieving its core responsibility in the Western Balkans. It should use its leverage to promote reform and the resolution of bilateral issues, thereby strengthening stability in a region still struggling to overcome its difficult past. The recent funeral of convicted Bosnian Serb war criminal Ratko Mladic demonstrates how important this task remains: the presence of senior Serbian state representatives at his commemoration has caused shock and dismay across the region and within the EU, as well as among many Serbian citizens.
A Regional Perspective
At the end of the wars of the 1990s, the EU adopted a regional framework toward the Western Balkans. The idea was simple and appealing: improving relations between the Western Balkan countries would go hand in hand with closer ties to the EU. Two decades on, this has led to many challenges and some successes, but only Croatia has become a fully fledged EU member state. While the stagnation in the enlargement process is partly due to a lack of commitment from regional governments, it is also a result of internal EU blockages and a lack of urgency while it dealt with a series of pressing crises.
After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, however, enlargement suddenly became a priority again. The EU understood that it needed to prevent a grey area emerging between itself and Russia. Ukraine and Moldova obtaining candidate status in 2022 revived member-state interest in the dormant case of the Western Balkans enlargement process; Montenegro and Albania recognized the geopolitical opportunity, accelerated their reform efforts, and have arrived at a point where EU accession is a realistic possibility.
But the main impetus for this new momentum toward enlargement is dramatically different from what originally drove Western Balkans integration. While the eventual integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the EU aims to strengthen European defenses in the face of a common threat, Western Balkan enlargement was meant to foster regional stability and reconciliation among countries that had been at war with each other.
The successful accession of a Western Balkan country may signal to the rest of the region that EU membership is possible and that enlargement is truly a merit-based process, which rewards those advancing reform and making the right geopolitical choices. However, neither the EU nor the Western Balkans can ignore the fact that Kosovo is stuck due to unresolved status issues, Bosnia and Herzegovina carries the burden of a dysfunctional constitution imposed by the international community, and North Macedonia is held back by bilateral issues with its EU neighbors. Focusing on the countries facing the fewest obstacles to accession might suit the geopolitical needs of the moment, but it risks losing sight of the original regional dimension of Western Balkans enlargement
Toward a New European Approach
The European Commission is aware that it needs to provide incentives for countries without an early accession perspective. It is planning to present new proposals on gradual integration in its forthcoming communication on 30 September. A more ambitious and flexible framework for gradual integration, aiming to include countries in parts of the internal market, would encourage reforms and allow the EU to develop a more intelligent and honest approach to conditionality. This is especially necessary for advancing the rule of law and democratic standards, which are all too often neglected in favor of the broader geopolitical picture. This has contributed to the diminished transformative power of the accession process and negatively impacted regional stability.
In addition to exploring options for gradual integration, the EU should revive the diplomatic processes at the heart of what its regional approach was originally meant to achieve. This requires redoubling efforts on the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, progressing state reform of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and engaging with member states to clear the blockages holding North Macedonia back. This would contribute to regional stability and advance Europe’s geopolitical agenda by reducing opportunities for Russia, China, and other actors to exert influence in the region.
The generations that lived through the good and the bad of the regional past are getting older. They might not live to see the European future promised to them at the turn of the century. Many would, however, still remember a line from an old Italian comic book Alan Ford, much loved in former Yugoslavia: “It is much better to be rich and beautiful than to be poor and ugly”. If the EU does not redouble its efforts to close remaining unresolved issues, its membership criteria would effectively follow the same logic. This would be a sad case of the EU abandoning its own ambition and responsibility.
Author
Milica Delević
Milica Delevic is secretary general of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). She has held senior roles at the bank. Prior to joining the EBRD, Delevic, a Serbian national, had a long career working in the Serbian government, academia and civil society.
This article originally appeared on the website of the European Council on Foreign Relations.
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.
