While the EU still has a strong positive image in Latvia, the country’s economic progress has stalled in recent years. From the EUROPP LSE blog.

In 2003, just before Latvia’s EU membership referendum, the country’s national broadcaster ran a news report about attitudes toward the EU in a small Latvian village named Zeltini. This year, on the 20th anniversary of Latvia’s EU accession, journalists returned to the village to learn what has changed since then.

Despite fears about increasing living costs and strict European laws, most villagers in Zeltini voted to join the EU in the 2003 referendum. In 2024, this initial skepticism had largely disappeared – people praised public infrastructure, such as the road network that has been renovated with EU funding, and the possibility to travel freely and feel part of a larger European community.

Important problems remained, though. Many inhabitants had left for the capital, Riga, or elsewhere. The public school and the nearby family doctor practice had also been closed. Except for some refurbished public spaces, there had been no other public development projects. However, for villagers, this was seen as the fault of the national government, not the EU.

True, as one interviewee noted, Europe appeared to disregard traditional family values. But ultimately, as one villager explained back in 2003, it was better to have Danish rather than Russian entrepreneurs buy the land – a sentiment that has only become more resonant today, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This news story, wittingly or not, encapsulated the central narratives and themes that have defined Latvia’s European integration since 2004.

Security and the Economy

Security and economic development are the two key dimensions by which Latvia’s membership and progress in the EU have been defined by politicians and citizens alike. Security, understood as Latvia’s deeper integration into Western political structures, has always been the foremost goal of Latvian political elites.

This included economic policies, such as adopting the euro in the immediate aftermath of Latvia’s harsh 2009 economic crisis. Latvia pursued painful reforms and austerity policies during this period, which resulted in significant population loss from emigration. One of the central motivations for following this course was the perceived need by local politicians to show that Latvia belongs to the core of Europe. Russia’s recent actions have proven these security concerns valid. The EU’s foreign policy has subsequently moved closer to the position of Latvia and the other Baltic states.

Economic progress has been less straightforward. After experiencing rapid growth around the EU accession period and during the recovery from the depths of the recession in 2009, the Latvian economy has stagnated. According to the OECD, the rise in living standards has been much slower in Latvia since the economic crisis than in neighboring Estonia and Lithuania.

In the view of both international and local experts, the key factors behind this lag are low foreign and domestic investment levels, a lower share of manufacturing in Latvia, and insufficient development of innovation and higher-value products. Perhaps the most worrying aspect is that the enormous emigration Latvia has experienced has significantly reduced the number of young and qualified people in the workforce. The notion of working abroad has become an established part of Latvian national identity.

At the same time, focusing on GDP can overshadow low spending on social assistance, health, and education, as well as the systemic issues in these sectors. Latvia has deeply embraced the neoliberal mindset, even rejecting recommendations from the European Union to extend social protection. Though the present situation seems alarming for many, others take a long-term perspective, where many trends, including in migration and social policy, show a positive development, though slower than was expected at the start of EU membership.

The Latvian Paradox

Regardless of the perception of the state’s development, Latvians are mostly appreciative of the European Union, and, in contrast to most Central and Eastern Europeans, support for the EU has increased over time. Even if the country has conservative attitudes, such as regarding LGBTQ+ rights and immigration, this does not reflect on Europe as an imposing force on national identity. And while security matters, most citizens view economic gains and free movement as the greatest benefits of being in the EU.

The paradox in Latvia is that despite being a faithful and committed party to the EU vision of modernization, the situation in the country has stagnated or become worse. It is impossible to simply put the fault on the EU, given it has clearly played a crucial role in bettering many sectors of society. However, ascribing full responsibility to national governments is not helpful either.

For Latvian citizens and experts, national policies are responsible for the country’s lack of progress. Despite this, the current ruling party, New Unity, has managed to stay in power since 2009, apart from a three-year period between 2016 and 2019. Though the party has shifted its form over the years, its liberal, pro-modernization, and anti-corruption ethos has remained the same. Latvian political elites, particularly since the economic crisis, have earnestly embraced the “European way.”.

There has always been a shared goal in the political imaginary of Latvian society and politicians – to modernize, become wealthier, and become more like Western countries. However, discussions of what these vague formulas mean in practice have been mostly absent in the political space, reflecting weak, almost non-existent ties between voters and political representatives.

Far from being passive, Latvian civil society mobilizes around different issues; however, it is rarely mediated by political institutions and actors. Instead, Latvian institutions embrace the EU guidance on most national legislation as it creates the framework of reference for their decisions.

The impact that Latvia has sought on the European Union has very rarely been expressed as advancing its own national interests. Instead, these interests, such as greater security guarantees in the neighboring region, have been positioned as advancing EU goals. With the EU’s approach to Russia changing in the last two years, Latvia has become more assertive, such as in calling for an EU-wide ban on agricultural imports from Russia. Whether this signifies a change to the previously largely asymmetrical mode of the relationship remains to be seen.

In many ways, the neoliberal mandate has freed politics of its purpose as a space for expressing and formulating identities and opinions, to debate, demand, and articulate decisions. Political elites have understood and presented the neoliberal transition in post-socialist contexts as a “no alternative” scenario. But in Latvia – aided by the ethos of self-sufficiency and individual success, highly polarizing ethnic division, and cultural narratives that associate politics with venality, not public service – that space has been particularly limited.

The European Union, the remote and abstract actor, symbolizes the dream of economic and social modernization, while national leaders epitomize its failed reality. To date, the gap in-between remains empty and shapeless, although there are positive indications, such as the slowly growing trust in national institutions and the rise of the center-left alternative in Latvian politics.

Often, a crisis, such as the current regional insecurity, can also mean an opportunity. The crucial outcome of the present crisis could be a closer and more meaningful relationship between citizens and political representatives. Being a “model pupil,” Latvia has rarely pushed to make its voice heard in the wider EU politics.

As argued by the former Latvian President Egils Levits, “old Europe is still suffering from a lack of ability to recognize the merits of our position … which can partly be also blamed on our inability to break out of this ‘asymmetrical infatuation.’” The challenge for Latvian citizens and politicians is to work together in articulating Latvia’s voice and the challenge for its European partners is to listen to diverse voices and co-create a more balanced relationship.

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Lelde Luika is a postdoctoral researcher in the Centre of Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES) at Sodertorn University. This article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. This article was originally published by the EUROPP LSE blog and has been reprinted with permission.